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1Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of asset speciﬁcity on the performance of pro-
curement auctions with subcontracting and asset sales. The analysis highlights
the role of several asset features like transfer costs, type of alternative uses and
maintenance requirements. It is argued that, if bargaining over subcontracting
or asset sales is eﬃcient enough, then the presence of durable speciﬁc assets
per se does not have decisive eﬀects on the competitive pressure from potential
entrants.
Keywords: Fundamental Transformation, Transaction Cost Economics, fran-
chise bidding, natural monopoly, regulation, procurement, auctions, hold-up,
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3CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The central notion of Transaction Cost Economics is the Fundamental Transfor-
mation from ex-ante competition to ex-post (bilateral) monopoly for transactions
involving speciﬁc durable assets.1 Its logic can be explained in four steps.
First, long-term complete contingent contracts are generally not be feasible be-
cause of bounded rationality or other costs of writing and enforcing contractual
clauses.2
Second, short-term or otherwise incomplete contracts have to be adapted (i.e.,
renegotiated) to keep track of unfolding events after a relatively short term – hence
before the end of the useful life of the speciﬁc assets involved.
Third, even if competitive conditions prevailed at the time the transaction was
ﬁrst agreed upon, contracts are renewed in an essentially non-competitive environ-
ment: only one party owns some assets that are necessary for the transaction and
practically useless for anything else. This asymmetry, it is argued, would make other
potential producers virtually irrelevant: all the action is about the distribution of
quasi-rents arising from the sunk asset.
Finally, the anticipation of this ex-post hold-up over quasi-rents may be the
source of ex-ante ineﬃciencies. Appropriate choices of ownership patterns or more
complex governance structures may thus be required to mitigate such ineﬃciencies.
This paper focuses on the third step of the argument and studies how diﬀerent
types of asset speciﬁcity aﬀect the degree of ex-post competition. A ﬁrst key obser-
vation is that the asset may be speciﬁc to the provision of a given good to a given
buyer, but not speciﬁc to any given seller: The incumbent seller could sell the asset
to a new entrant. This is not, of course, an original observation. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the corresponding bargaining game has not been formally investigated in the
existing literature. A second key observation is that, even if the asset is also speciﬁc
1Williamson (1985) is the classic reference. A shorter and more recent survey is in Williamson
(2002).
2The enforcement problems comes from Williamson’s other behavioral assumption: agents are
seeking self-interest with guile. Reputational concerns may be insuﬃcient to induce respect for the
spirit, as well as the letter of contracts.
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to the seller, a new entrant could win the contract to supply the buyer and then
subcontract production (or part of it) to the former incumbent. To the best of my
knowledge, the possibility of subcontracting has not been considered in discussions
of the Fundamental Transformation. In this paper, it is shown that subcontracting
could be enough to ﬁx prices at competitive levels also at the contract renewal stage.
Formally, this paper studies a class of inﬁnite sequences of procurement auctions
in which winning entrants can freely bargain with current asset owners over asset
transfers or subcontracting. Bargaining after each auction is assumed to follow a
generalized Nash rule, although some forms of bargaining ineﬃciencies will also be
considered.
The eﬀectiveness of ex-post competition is shown to depend on the eﬃciency of
bargaining, the parties’s bargaining power, the duration of contracts (here taken as
an exogenous parameter), the discount factor (which can also proxy for the degree
of uncertainty over future transactions) and, of course, the durability and speciﬁcity
of the assets.
The bargaining component of the analysis is decisive. For almost all values of
the other parameters, ex-post competition can be totally irrelevant or completely
eﬀective at eliminating incumbency advantages depending on (the product of) the
probability of reaching an agreement and entrants’ share of surplus in the agree-
ment.3 However, if one assumes that bargaining is eﬃcient enough and that en-
trants would not buy assets from incumbents at prices above market levels, then
ex-post competition can be shown to be quite eﬀective in these models. The poten-
tial failures of ex-post competition would then have to be searched among aspects
not considered here – and probably not related to the presence of durable assets.
In the next section, we provide further motivations for this paper by referring to
the related literature. Section 3 presents the simplest version of the model, which is
then extended to include diﬀerent operating costs in Section 4, alternative forms of
asset speciﬁcity in Section 5, resale obligations in Section 6, investment requirements
in Section 7. Concluding remarks are in Section 8.
3Williamson’s own work is always very careful to point out that his analysis shows the importance
of potential contractual problems, not their inevitability.
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2 Related literature
2.1 Franchise bidding for natural monopoly
The possibility of transferring transaction-speciﬁc assets to a new supplier was ﬁrst
made by Posner (1972) in his proposal to use franchise bidding for the cable television
industry.4
The idea of franchise bidding, i.e., using competitive bidding for the exclusive
right to provide some public utility services, has a long history.5 More than one
hundred and ﬁfty years ago, Sir Edwin Chadwick began his advocacy of “competition
for the ﬁeld” as an alternative to (unregulated) “competition within the ﬁeld”.
Chadwick (1859) advocates franchise bidding not only for what we now call “public
utilities” (water distribution and railways), but also for a variety of other industries,
including funerals, cabs, bread and beer. His arguments are based partly on the
exploitation of (alleged) economies of scale, but mainly on the need to remedy other
kinds of market failures. Demsetz’s (1968) case for franchise bidding comes from
a diﬀerent direction. He pointed out that technological economies of scale do not
imply per se the necessity of price regulation to prevent monopoly pricing. The
regulator (a government agency or a buyers’ cooperative) could “simply” have to
run a procurement auction and the “competitive” price will prevail.6 According to
Demsetz (1968), whether franchise bidding or regulation are to be preferred must
be decided on the basis of a case-by-case analysis of the relevant contracts and
transaction costs.
In his analysis of the cable television industry, Posner (1972) advocates the
use of franchise bidding as opposed to traditional price regulation. In particular, he
proposes the use of franchise contracts with relatively short-term duration in order to
4The paper by Posner(1972) actually predates the use of the term Fundamental Transformation
and is more or less contemporaneous with Williamson’s earliest work on the topic.
5See Crocker and Masten (1996) for an extensive survey.
6This “competitive price” may be a ﬁrst-best non-linear price or a second-best (minimum average
cost) linear price, but this is a side issue. See the 1972 exchange between Telser and Demsetz in
the Journal of Political Economy. For formal analysis of second-best mechanism design solutions
see the monographs by Spulber (1989) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
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maintain ﬂexibility in dealing with a (then) young industry. Williamson (1976) and
Goldberg (1976) argue instead that the transaction costs involved in the production
of public utility services are quite considerable. Franchise bidding arrangements
would likely be fraught with controversies and renegotiations that may be better
dealt with in a more hands-on regulatory environment. Most of Williamson’s and
Goldberg’s arguments seem to be concerned with uncertainty and risk-sharing in the
presence of long-term investments and contracts.7 Williamson, in particular, worries
about the hold-up problems related to the Fundamental Transformation.8 Posner
himself had considered this issue and argued that it did not pose a serious problem
for a couple of reasons: ﬁrst, because a winning entrant and a losing incumbent
would always negotiate an eﬃcient transfer of the speciﬁc assets; second, because
regulators could always mandate the transfer of the assets “at its original cost, as
depreciated.” Williamson convincingly argues that the latter claim is unwarranted,
as ﬁnding an appropriate valuation is much harder and open to manipulation than
Posner seemed to believe. Williamson’s criticism of Posner’s ﬁrst claim (which is
the focus of this paper) is less cogent. Williamson mentions the possibility that
transaction-speciﬁc human capital may be acquired in the course of operating the
franchise and that human capital can be hard to transfer to another ﬁrm.9 However,
Williamson does not consider the possibility of subcontracting as an alternative to
asset transfers. Moreover, the quantitative signiﬁcance of such ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
(human or otherwise) is unclear and, at least in the models of this paper, small cost
diﬀerences have only small (or even zero) eﬀects on equilibrium prices.
Williamson’s criticism seems to have been taken as conclusive by most under-
graduate textbooks on regulation – even more than by Williamson himself.10 Fur-
7Demsetz (1968) instead focused on the more traditional rationale for regulation, namely
economies of scale. Indeed, his paper can be interpreted as doing for economies of scale what
Coase (1960) had done earlier for externalities.
8Peacock and Rowley (1972) also criticized
Demsetz’s proposal on this ground.
9See Lewis and Yildirim (2002) for a model of optimal buyer’s policy in the presence of learning-
by-doing.
10For example, see Schmalensee (1979) and Sherman (1989). Train (1991) makes an interesting
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ther research has focused exclusively on the design of auction procedures that jointly
determined the winner’s prize and the terms for the transfer (when technically pos-
sible) of production assets to winning entrants. For example, Laﬀont and Tirole
(1988) studies how regulators should commit to bias the renewal auction in order
to compensate for the incumbency asymmetry while providing incentives for the
incumbent to make eﬃcient unobservable investments in the asset.11
The paper closest to this one is Harstad and Crew (1999). They also consider an
inﬁnite sequence of second-price auctions (as opposed to two period models), but in
their model bids determine the price of the asset that would be transferred according
to a (more or less arbitrary) function.12 In order to preserve incentive compatibility,
the losing incumbent receives a higher payment than the price paid by the winning
entrant. Coming up with the diﬀerence (and committing to do so in future auctions
by using the same transfer function) may be a problem for regulators.13
These papers assume that the asset is fully relationship speciﬁc and that the
incumbent cannot threaten to walk away with it. It is as if they assumed that the
assets are owned by the regulator/buyer and merely operated by the incumbents.
In practice, that is what often happens: Many public services are procured using
“Build, Operate and Transfer” (BOT) contracts.14 The problem is essentially re-
duced to a possibly diﬃcult, but conceptually standard moral hazard issue. The
principal (regulator or buyer) “only” needs to provide incentives for the contractor
connection with the contestability literature, implicitly equating the feasibility of franchise bidding
with that of moving assets to other uses. For a counterexample, see the textbook by Viscusi, Vernon
and Harrington (2000).
11See also Stole (1994). The mechanism design literature on auctioning franchise contracts,
supplier switching and dual sourcing is surveyed in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
12Their paper also diﬀers from this one in that they allow for period-by-period private cost
information, but consider only costlessly transferable assets.
13The authors discuss informally some ways in which the balanced-budget problem could be
tackled. This would not be a problem in a procurement context, but there the commitment problem
would be more serious.
14See Klein et. al. (1998) for more details and a rather positive assessment of the eﬀectiveness
of these contracts. Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001) propose an original method to determine
endogenously the duration of such contracts.
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to make enough eﬀorts to maintain the asset.
The point of Williamson’s analysis, however, is that it is often ineﬃcient to
assign de facto ownership of the assets to the buyer. For example, the buyer may be
unable to assess the conditions, technical needs and market value of an asset. The
point of this paper is that the incumbent’s competitors may instead have the ability
to evaluate such assets (or to negotiate subcontracting agreements) at reasonable
cost.
In support of his thesis, Williamson (1976) cites the city of Oakland’s unhappy
experience with cable television franchising, where the auction winner successfully
renegotiated the contract, supplying lower quality service at higher prices. How-
ever, later empirical investigations by Mark Zupan (1989a,b,c) and Robin Prager
(1989, 1990), however, showed that Williamson’s example was not really represen-
tative of the U.S. CATV franchising experience.15 Franchise bidding has also been
employed in other industries and infrastructure projects such as roads and seaports
in Chile (Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 2001), railways (Aﬀuso and Newbery, 2002),
bus services (Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2003), local electricity distribution (Lit-
tlechild, 2002) in the United Kingdom, telecommunications services in Peru, Chile
and Colombia (Raja, 2003). In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that franchise
bidding can work well, at least if enough care is taken in designing the auctions.
2.2 Subcontracting
Technically, this paper extends the analysis in Sorana (2000) to take durable assets
into account. Kamien, Li and Samet (1989) and Spiegel (1993) are some of the
earliest models of subcontracting.16 They consider one-shot procurement situations
15In their survey, Crocker and Masten (1996) point out that a proper evaluation ought to consider
a comparison with cases where alternative regulatory methods had been employed. Such relative
comparisons would be quite diﬃcult due to selection bias: franchise bidding may seem to work well
precisely because regulators are smart enough to choose it only when it would work well.
16The case of seller’s auctions with resale is somewhat more complex since there is no natural
deadline for post-auction bargaining. The seminal analysis, also in a complete information setting,
is in Milgrom (1987). Extensions to imperfect information are in Ausubel and Cramton (1999a,b),
Haile (2003) and Zheng (2003).
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where asset sales are indistinguishable from post-auction subcontracting and the
latter is motivated by the assumption of decreasing returns to scale technologies.
Krishnan and R¨ oller (1993) and Antelo and Bru (2002) focus on how subcontracting
aﬀects the degree of competition in the market. Krishnan and R¨ oller (1993) study
the case in which entrants can buy capacity from the incumbent before competing
(once) ` a la Cournot. Antelo and Bru (2002) show the equivalence of subcontracting
(via forward contracts) and sales of capacity before one stage of a model of Cournot
competition with a competitive fringe. Gale, Hausch and Stegeman (2000) study
a (ﬁnite) sequence of procurement auctions with post-auction subcontracting. In
their model, the auctions are run independently (and asynchronously) by several
buyers and the dynamic links are due to the sellers’ capacity constraints. They do
not consider the possibility of altering capacity by selling the corresponding assets.
2.3 Contract duration
Williamson’s (1976) criticism of Posner (1972) focuses on the privileged position
of incumbents when the franchise duration is shorter than the life of speciﬁc as-
sets. Goldberg (1976) worries about the opposite problem: in the ex-post bilateral
monopoly situation caused by the Fundamental Transformation, regulators may
have the upper hand and de facto expropriate the incumbent’s assets, e.g., by set-
ting rates that ignore the (sunk) cost of the assets. Firms’ fears of expropriation
could lead to lack of investment incentives and higher procurement prices incorpo-
rating that risk. The problem is caused by the alleged lack of commitment power by
the regulator, who would switch from franchise bidding to negotiated rate-setting.17
This could happen also within the duration of the franchise contract, possibly in
response to unforeseen contingencies aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s costs or consumers’ valua-
tions.
The eﬀect of unforeseen contingencies on contract structure is still theoretically
17In the U.S. and elsewhere there are constitutional provisions against such “takings.” Goldberg
essentially assumes that unscrupulous regulators (or, rather, regulators that are overzealous in
defending consumers’ interests) might be able to evade judicial enforcement. These tactics would
probably be easier for private buyers in procurement contexts.
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unsettled and it will not be discussed further in this paper. In fact, there is no
explicit consideration of uncertainty in this paper, except in the last section on
asset maintenance.18 Moreover, only the most passive of regulatory behavior is
considered here: the regulator/buyer is committed to run a sequence of second-
price procurement auctions without reserve prices. Even with full commitment
and no uncertainty, Goldberg’s concern with short franchise duration is justiﬁed:
procurement costs are higher with shorter franchises.19
Longer contract durations tend to increase incentives for (non-veriﬁable) invest-
ments.20 This is generally considered to be beneﬁcial, because of under-investment
results in standard property rights models.
Aﬀuso and Newbery (2002) show that, in the case of UK railway operation
franchises, incumbents have generally invested suﬃciently, though they seemed to
concentrate their investments near the end of the franchise term. They conjecture
that this is done to induce the regulator to extend their franchise.21
As shown in Section 7, it is also possible that investment incentives are excessive
from the social welfare point of view. The intuition comes directly from Williamson’s
Fundamental Transformation: if being the incumbent confers ex-post market power,
it may pay to own productive assets already at the ex-ante competitive stage. The
role of durable capital as a pre-emption device to create or develop incumbency
advantages has also been studied in the industrial organization literature, starting
18The discount factor may be interpreted as m incorporating a probability of termination of
the relationship. This would not be enough to allow a meaningful discussion of the costs of long
contract duration, because the discount factor applies also to periods within a contract. Introducing
a separate probability of termination at the end of the contract would be a straightforward extension
and it is left for further research.
19However, contrary to Goldberg’s case, incumbents beneﬁt from shorter franchises.
20See Bandiera (2002) for some empirical evidence on contract duration and further references.
Fudenberg, Levine and Milgrom (1990) show that, in the absence of non-veriﬁable investments,
anything that can be implemented by long-term contracts can also be implemented by short-term
ones.
21At the time of this writing, only a few franchise have expired, so it is too early to judge this
issue. Neeman and Orosel (1999) develop a formal model along these lines.
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with Eaton and Lipsey (1980).22
3 The basic model
Consider an industry with two ﬁrms, referred to as the incumbent I and the entrant
E, competing for the provision of “service” to a (representative) consumer with rigid
unit demand for the service. The quality and features of the service are assumed to
be well-deﬁned and veriﬁable. Its production requires an inﬁnitely lived asset which
can be produced at cost K and that has no alternative use.23 I will abuse notation
by using K for both the asset itself and for its cost. Both ﬁrms require the same
kind of asset in order to provide service and the structure and quality of the asset
cannot be modiﬁed. The asset can be transferred freely between the two ﬁrms.24
There are no other production costs.25
The time-line of the model is as follows:
1. Firms bid in a second-price procurement auction without reserve price. The
object of the auction is the obligation to provide service for D periods (D ≥ 1);
the lowest bidder is paid the other ﬁrm’s bid, with ties resolved by uniform
randomization.26
2. The winner has one period to procure the asset – either externally (at cost
K) or via bargaining with the other ﬁrm if the latter owns one. Bargaining is
eﬃcient and the auction winner gets share α ∈ [0,1] of the gains from trade.27
3. The winner must provide (directly or via subcontracting) service for D periods.
22See Gilbert (1989) for a survey and Ponssard (2000) for a more recent contribution.
23Alternative uses are considered in section 5. The possibility of asset failures and the role of
maintenance costs are considered in section 7.
24Section 5 considers transfer costs.
25Operating costs are considered in section 4.
26The assumption that the winner receives the whole price as an initial lump sum payment does
not aﬀect the analysis in this paper. Some of its eﬀects on the incentives for service quality and
collusion are studied in Sorana (2001, Ch. 4).
27These are determined endogenously as continuation values of the game.
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4. The game goes back to step one.28
Both buyer and ﬁrms discount the future at the same (commonly known) dis-
count factor (1+r)−1 ∈ [0,1) per period. It will be convenient to let δ ≡ (1+r)−D.
Firms are not allowed to sign contracts that extend beyond the current franchise
duration, nor can they own more than one instance of the asset.
The state of this dynamic game is deﬁned by the ﬁrms’ asset ownership proﬁles
x = {xf ∈ {0,K}}f∈{I,E}.
Only Markov perfect equilibria with constant α will be considered.
Proposition 1 In the only symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game, the
net present values NPV of procurement costs (snpv) and of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts (πf)
are






πE 0 0 0
The values in state (0,K) are then determined by symmetry.
Proof: In state (K,K) both ﬁrms can provide service at zero cost and the usual
Bertrand logic (together with the observation that (K,K) is an absorbing state)
gives the desired result.
Assume now that the initial state is (K,0). If I wins the auction at price p0,
then it provides the service and the state is unchanged. We have:
πI
wins = p0 + δπI(K,0)
πE
loses = 0 + δπE(K,0)
If E wins the auction at price p, then it must buy the asset.29
28One may think of the auction as being run one period before the end of the franchise in order
to allow time for asset procurement without service interruption.
29Borrowing the asset or subcontracting service provision to I would lead to the same equilibrium
payoﬀs.
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The eﬃcient outcome is to buy it from the incumbent, say at price pK, in which
case
πI = pK + δπI(0,K)
πE = p − pK + δπE(0,K)
If bargaining fails, E procures K externally and
πI = 0 + δπI(K,K) = 0
πE = p − K + δπE(K,K) = p − K
The gains from trade are
G = δ(πI(0,K) + πE(0,K)) + K > 0
These are positive since proﬁts must always be non-negative.30 By assumption,
the eﬃcient payoﬀs are realized and I gets a fraction (1−α) of G over the disagree-
ment payoﬀ: πI = (1 − α)G + 0. From this we get pK = (1 − α)G − δπI(0,K).
Therefore
πI
loses = (1 − α){δ[πI(0,K) + πI(K,0)] + K}
πE
wins = p − αδ[πI(0,K) + πI(K,0)] + (1 − α)K
Bids in the second-price (procurement) auction are the diﬀerence between the








bI = (1 − α){δ[πI(0,K) + πI(K,0)] + K} − δπI(K,0) = bE = p = p0
30This proves that the eﬃcient outcome is indeed eﬃcient from the point of view of the ﬁrms.
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loses = πf(K,0), hence we can ﬁnd the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs
by looking at π
f
loses. For the entrant, we get πE(K,0) = 0 + δπE(K,0), hence
πE(K,0) = 0. For the incumbent, we get
πI(K,0) = (1 − α){δ[0 + πI(K,0)] + K}
=
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K
Finally, we get s =
(1−δ)(1−α)
1−δ(1−α) K. This concludes the proof for x0 = (K,0).
Assume now that the initial state is (0,0). The winner of the auction will have
to “build” the asset at cost K and will then enter the next auction as the incumbent
in state (K,0). So both ﬁrms will bid K − δπI(K,0) = K − δ 1−α
1−δ(1−α)K and this
will be the procurement cost in the ﬁrst auction. The net present values are then
snpv(0,0) = K − δ
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K + δsnpv(K,0) = K
πWin(0,0) = [K − δ
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K] − K + δπI(K,0) = 0
πWin(0,0) = 0
Q. E. D.
Recalling that δ = (1 + r)−D, it follows immediately that
Corollary 1 If the initial state is (K,0), procurement costs are strictly decreasing
in the auction winner’s bargaining power (α) and in the franchise duration (D).
Proof: By direct computation:
∂snpv(K,0)






∂D < 0 since the ﬁrst term is positive and the second negative.
Q. E. D.
Goldberg’s conjecture that procurement costs would be higher with shorter fran-
chise terms is thus conﬁrmed even in a model without uncertainty. The intuition for
this result is that the NPV of proﬁts from future auctions without duplicate assets
decreases with D, hence so do the gains from trade G, the asset price pK = (1−α)G
and thus the ﬁrms’ bids.
It is important to notice that procurement costs are highly dependant on the
model’s “free” parameter α. For example:
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• if α = 0, then snpv(K,0) = K
1−δ, i.e., in every auction other than the ﬁrst one,
procurement costs are equal to the entire value of the inﬁnitely lived asset. In
this case, payoﬀs are as if neither asset sales, nor subcontracting were possible
and Williamson’s hold-up theory is fully conﬁrmed.
• if α = 0.5, then snpv(K,0) = K
2−δ < K.
• if α = 1, then snpv(K,0) = 0 = πI(K,0). Goldberg’s concern about expro-
priation can thus be justiﬁed also in this model, but for diﬀerent reasons and
with a very diﬀerent outcome: consumers beneﬁt from it.
This wide range of possible outcomes may be a serious cause of concern for
risk-averse regulators who have little information or control over the structure of
post-auction bargaining. If the model presented here were to be taken literally, this
problem would have an easy solution: the regulator could simply require that the
winning bidder make a single take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to buy the asset. Obviously,
however, this would be a dangerous restriction in the more realistic case in which
the ﬁrms do not know each other’s costs and asset conditions exactly.31
In the MPE of the basic model, the resale price of the asset is larger than its
production cost if δ > 1−α
α or, equivalently, α < δ/(1 + δ).
So believing that pK must be smaller than K is equivalent to believing a restric-
tion on α ≥ δ/(1 − δ).
The result does not depend on the fact that there is only one potential entrant
in the model. If the potential entrants diﬀer in their bargaining power (i.e., in the
price for which they can get the asset from its owner), then the one with the best
bargaining power (highest α) will have a higher value from winning. It will bid less
than the other entrants and its bid (equal to the incumbent’s) will determine the
outcome of the game.
31A natural direction of further research would be to move towards mechanism design approaches
in which the regulator controls at least some aspects of the asset transfer procedure. The motivation
for this paper, however, was to study what happens when the regulator does not bother with this
problem at all.
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3.1 Bargaining failures
The analysis in this paper is based on the assumption that when the deadline for ser-
vice provision (or for the time-to-build constraint to become binding) approaches,
the parties reach an eﬃcient agreement. Yet there is experimental evidence that
bargaining parties may fail to reach an agreement before the deadline even in com-
plete information games that are simpler than those studied in this paper.32 In this
section we account for bargaining failures, albeit in a rather ad hoc fashion.
We assume that there is an exogenous probability β of break-down in bargaining
negotiations. However, if there is no breakdown, then the bargaining outcome is as
before (i.e., as if β = 0).33
The expressions for the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs when the incumbent wins, for the eﬃcient
and disagreement payoﬀs when the entrant wins are unchanged and so is that for
the asset resale price when bargaining succeeds.
However, the expected payoﬀs when the entrant wins must now reﬂect the pos-
sibility of bargaining failure:
πI
loses = β · 0 + (1 − β)πI
eﬀ
= (1 − β)(1 − α)(K + δπI(K,0))
πE
wins = β[pE − K] + (1 − β)πE
eﬀ
= pE − [β + (1 − β)(1 − α)]K + (1 − β)αδπI(K,0)
By the usual calculations, the ﬁrms’ equilibrium bids satisfy
bI = (1 − β)(1 − α)K − [1 − (1 − β)(1 − α)]δπI(K,0))
bE = [β + (1 − β)(1 − α)]K − (1 − β)αδπI(K,0)
Since bE −bI = β(K +δπI(K,0)) > 0, the (current) incumbent always wins and the
equilibrium price in the auction is equal to entrant’s bid: s = pI = bE.
32See Roth et al. (1988) for the experimental evidence. Ma and Manove (1993) build a theoretical
model based on random delays in the communication of oﬀers in which the (unique) MPE involves
strategic delay and positive probability of bargaining failure.
33In the model by Ma and Manove (1993) the levels of α and β are determined as part of the
equilibrium and α is shown to be close to one half.
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The incumbent’s payoﬀ then satisﬁes
πI(K,0) = s + δπI(K,0)
= [β + (1 − β)(1 − α)]K + [1 − (1 − β)α]δπI(K,0)
=
1 − α(1 − β)




(1 − δ)[1 − α(1 − β)]
1 − δ[1 − α(1 − β)]
K
Summing up,
Proposition 2 If post-auction bargaining breaks down with (exogenous) probability
β > 0, then the incumbent will always win the auction. The ﬁrms’ payoﬀ and the
procurement costs will change as if the bargaining power of the auction winner had
been lowered from α to ˆ α ≡ α(1 − β).
Remark: Since the incumbent always wins, there is no bargaining, hence the
possibility of bargaining failure at the subcontracting stage remains oﬀ the equi-
librium path of the whole game. This need not be the case if bidders had private
information about their valuations.
Remark: Although the formulas remain the same, one should be careful in the
interpretation. The “intuitive” reason for restricting α to the interval [δ/(1 + δ),1]
(i.e., keeping pK ≤ K) does not extend to ¯ α.
4 Operating costs
In the basic model, both ﬁrms are assumed to have the same (zero) costs to operate
the durable assets. In this section, the model is extended to allow diﬀerent operating
costs which do not depend on asset ownership. For notational simplicity, only the
case of constant costs will be considered.
Let service provision in any given period require costs equal to cf for ﬁrm f ∈
{I,E}. These operating costs are independent of whether a ﬁrm buys or leases a
new durable asset or one previously used by the other ﬁrm.
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The description of post-auction bargaining now needs some assumptions about
timing. It seems natural to assume that, if bargaining initially ends in disagreement
and an entrant builds duplicate facilities, there is still time to bargain over the
transfer of service production (subcontracting).34 The idea is that procurement of
the asset cannot be instantaneous and simultaneous with the provision of service,
so there is always time for further negotiations.
Somewhat informally, the structure of bargaining can be described as follows:
1. if the winner owns the asset and has lower variable costs than the loser, then
there is nothing to bargain about.
2. if the winner does not own the asset and has lower variable costs than the
loser, then it will try to buy the asset from the loser. As in the basic model,
the (privately) eﬃcient outcome is reached (i.e., the asset is sold) and the
buyer gets a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the gains from trade.
3. if the winner does not own the asset and has higher variable costs than the
loser, then it will try to delegate production to the loser. Since the winner
has to provide service by a ﬁxed deadline, if no agreement is reached “early
enough,” the winner will have to procure the asset externally.35 After that,
it will bargain again over the provision of service. In all cases, reached agree-
ments give the winner a fraction α of the gains from trade.
4. if the winner owns the asset and has higher variable costs, then it will want to
buy subcontracting services and either lease or sell the asset to the loser. In
the context of this model, leasing and selling are equivalent and I will present
the calculations for the case of sale only. Once again, agreements are reached
which give the winner a fraction α of the gains from trade.
Following steps similar to those used in the solution of the basic model, we get
34No hard feelings after previous break-ups!
35“Early enough” here means that there is enough time to build duplicate assets. If the auction
winner does not have enough time to do so,it would be at the mercy of the incumbent and end up
with an inﬁnitely negative payoﬀ.
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Proposition 3 Let c(1) ≡ min{cI,cE} and c(2) ≡ max{cI,cE}. In the only sym-
metric Markov-Perfect equilibrium of the game deﬁned above, the net present value




1−δ[αc(1) + (1 − α)c(2)] + K if x = (0,0)
1
1−δ[αc(1) + (1 − α)c(2)] + 1−α
1−δ(1−α)K if x 6= (0,0)




(c(2) − cf)+ +
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
(xf − x(2))+
Proof: See Appendix.
Given the assumptions of risk-neutrality and eﬃcient bargaining, it is straight-
forward to generalize the above proposition to the case in which operating costs
may change from period to period, following some Markov process independent of
asset ownership: The same formulas would hold in expectations. In particular, the
randomness of variable costs would not make shorter franchise terms more desirable.
However, this could be an important issue if subcontracting is not fully eﬃcient: if
the ﬁrms are asymmetrically informed, auctions may achieve eﬃciency when private
bargaining cannot, so running auctions more frequently may increase eﬃciency.
It is also easy to allow for the presence of several independent assets and cor-
responding operating costs. Let H be the set of asset types, Kh the cost of asset
h ∈ H, c
f
h is the corresponding operating cost for ﬁrm f and x
(2)
h be equal to Kh if
there is more than one ﬁrms that owns a type h asset and equal to zero otherwise.
Then the linearity of the Nash bargaining solution guarantees that the diﬀerent cost















































It is just a bit more diﬃcult (but much more tedious) to show that exactly the
same formulas hold if there are more than two ﬁrms – at least if auction winners
have enough time to run subcontracting auctions as well as direct negotiations.36
5 Alternative forms of asset speciﬁcity
The previous sections dealt with the case of assets that are perfectly transferable
across ﬁrms. This may be a reasonable assumption if all ﬁrms share the same
technology and can thus easily incorporate other ﬁrms’ assets into their network.
In the case of transferable assets, it is possible to provide service not only by
building or buying the asset, but also by leasing the asset for one or more periods at
the time. As mentioned above, allowing for the possibility of leasing does not change
the result of the analysis. In practice, however, leasing the incumbent’s assets for
one period may not be an eﬃcient contractual arrangement because of moral hazard
considerations (e.g., with regard to care and maintenance of the assets). But even
sales may be problematic if the quality of the asset is not easily observable by the
potential buyer. And sales could be out of the question if entrants are going to
adopt a technology that is incompatible with the incumbent’s. In sum, the asset
may be ﬁrm-speciﬁc as well as speciﬁc to the service under auction. Conversely, the
asset may be (at least partially) generic with respect to both ﬁrms and services.
5.1 Transfer costs
In practice, the transfer of assets always entails some adaptation costs. For example,
the new owner’s employees must learn the inevitable idiosyncracies of the assets.37
36For more details, see Sorana (2000, 2001).
37This includes the case of a winning entrant which buys out the incumbent ﬁrm as a whole or
simply hires its key employees: the buyer must then learn about the idiosyncracies of his or her
new employees.
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This is one Williamson’s (1976) major arguments for concern. However, if subcon-
tracting is eﬃcient, and there are no operating costs, then transfer costs have no
eﬀect on the equilibrium payoﬀs of the basic model. Their only consequence is that
a winning entrant will subcontract service provision instead of buying the asset and
providing the service itself. The incumbent will maintain the property of the asset,
but the future gains from incumbency will be reﬂected in a lower subcontracting
price.
Transfer costs do matter, even with eﬃcient subcontracting, if we consider op-
erating costs. The equilibrium outcome may then be socially ineﬃcient, but the
impact on procurement costs need not be too severe.
5.1.1 Firm-speciﬁc sunk assets with subcontracting
Assume that the asset K is not transferable, but fully sunk. For simplicity, I only
consider the model with one service component, one incumbent that already owns
the asset and one entrant that does not.38 Thus the system can be in only two states:
x = (K,0) or x = (K,K). To save on notation, I will drop the ﬁrst component of
the state and write x ∈ {0,K}.
Even if the asset is not transferable, it may still be possible to subcontract
the provision of service. The presence of sunk costs, however, introduces a new
possibility: production by the entrant may be unproﬁtable for bidders even when it
is eﬃcient. If the incumbent has relatively high variable costs, delegating production
to an entrant may be eﬃcient even considering the necessity to build duplicate
assets, but the presence of duplicate assets could reduce the equilibrium level of
subsidies in future auctions by more than the cost savings.39 This makes calculations
38Obviously, except for stranded costs consideration, it does not matter how much the incumbent
paid for the asset originally. Therefore this section does not assume that the two ﬁrms need the
same kind of asset or assets of equal prices. Formally, the analysis also applies to the case in which
one ﬁrm (here called “the incumbent”) does not need any specialized ﬁxed assets, while the other
(called “the entrant”) does.
39With transferable assets subcontracting can always occur without building duplicate assets and
thus leaving future subsidies unaﬀected.
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of disagreement payoﬀs much more complicated and, for simplicity, this section
considers the case D = 1 only and defers the proof to Appendix B.
Proposition 4 Consider a sequence of procurement auctions without reserve price
with one incumbent having operating costs equal to cI and a potential entrant having
operating costs equal to cE. Assume that the entrant would also have to incur a
one-time sunk cost K before it can provide any service.
Then, in the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game, service is provided by the
incumbent if




Otherwise, service will be provided by the entrant.
As a consequence, entry is eﬃcient when it occurs, but it fails to occur even if
it would be eﬃcient when




The ﬁrms’ proﬁts, the level of subsidies in the initial period and the net present
value of total subsidies are reported in the tables below.
cI − cE πI(0) πE(0)
cI − cE < 0 1−α
1−δ (cI − cE) + 1−α
1−δ(1−α)K 0





1−αδK − (cI − cE)] 0
1−δ
1−αδK < cI − cE 0 1−α
1−δ (cI − cE − 1−δ
1−αδK)
cI − cE s(0) snpv










1−αδK − (cI − cE)] 1
1−δs(0)
1−δ






Remark: As mentioned above, that the incumbent may have never paid the
entry cost K. It may be simply a ﬁrm that uses a technology with low (zero) sunk
costs. This result thus suggests that the procurement process is biased against
technologies that have higher sunk costs.
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5.1.2 Moderate transfer costs without subcontracting
For completeness, consider the possibility that the asset is transferable at some (non-
prohibitive) cost χ > 0, but subcontracting of service provision is not allowed. For
simplicity, I disregard variable costs and assume χ < K. In this case, the (eﬃcient)
payoﬀs for a winning entrant is equal to sE −pK −χ+δπ, the gains from trade are
K − χ + δπ > 0 and the usual analysis gives
bI = (1 − α)(K − χ) − αδπ
bE = bI + χ
Therefore the incumbent always wins and s = bE. As in the case of potential
bargaining failures, the incumbent has an eﬃciency advantage and this is reﬂected
in the bids. We ﬁnally obtain
s = bE =
1 − δ
1 − δ(1 − α)
[(1 − α)K + αχ]
snpv = π =
(1 − α)K + αχ
1 − δ(1 − α)
pK =
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
[K − (1 − δ)χ]
5.2 Partially speciﬁc assets
There are two diﬀerent cases to be considered. First, a ﬁrm may be able to use
the asset for other purposes that do not aﬀect the other bidder. For example, the
asset may have a positive scrap value. Second, the “other purposes” may aﬀect the
other ﬁrm’s proﬁt. For example, it could be used to compete with the other ﬁrm in
other markets or, if the regulator does not prevent it, in the market for the service
under consideration. As shown below, the two cases have dramatically diﬀerent
implications for the equilibrium level of bids.
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5.2.1 Assets with positive scrap value
Assume that the asset could be sold to third parties at price S ≤ K. The disagree-
ment outcome (in case the entrant wins the auction) is now for the incumbent to
sell the asset to third parties at price S rather than keeping it for no use. Therefore
the state of the game in the next auction will be (0,K) instead of (K,K) and the
ﬁrms’ payoﬀs will be
πI = S + δπI(0,K) = S
πE = pE − K + δπE(0,K)
The corresponding gains from trade in post-auction bargaining will then be equal to
K −S, so πI
loses = S +(1−α)(K −S) = αS +(1−α)K. The usual steps show that
this will be equal to the NPV of the incumbent’s proﬁts and of the procurement
costs. The price pK at which the entrant will buy the asset from the incumbent,
the ﬁrms’ bids and the payment s are all equal to (1 − δ)[αS + (1 − α)K].
It then follows that
Proposition 5 If the asset has a positive scrap value S ≤ K, the NPV of procure-
ment costs and incumbent’s proﬁts in the MPE of the game can never exceed the
actual cost of “building” the asset:
snpv = πI = αS + (1 − α)K ≤ K
In particular, they are independent of the interest rate and of the franchise du-
ration.
The presence of a positive scrap value (weakly) increases the procurement costs
and the incumbent’s proﬁt if
αS + (1 − α)K ≥
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K
and (weakly) decreases them if the reverse inequality holds.
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5.2.2 Asset usable for additional services
Control of the asset may confer advantages in markets other than the one for which
the auction is used. For example, the local loop used for basic telephone service
can also be used for ADSL and access to long distance services. Arguably, these
advantages would be less useful if other ﬁrms also owned similar assets.
To ﬁx ideas, let us assume that the asset is the only input that can produce
an additional service W, that no other input is useful for that purpose, that W is
sold in an unregulated market characterized by Bertrand competition, and that the
per-period monopoly proﬁt is w ≡ (1 − δ)πmon
W . By the Bertrand assumption, the
duopoly proﬁt is zero for a ﬁrm that already owns the asset and negative otherwise.40
It follows that πf(K,K) = 0, the disagreement payoﬀs are as before and the eﬃcient
payoﬀs (should the entrant win) are
πI
eﬀ = pK + δπI(0,K) = pK
πE
eﬀ = pE − pK + w + δπE(0,K)
The gains from trade are then G = K + w + δπE(0,K) and the usual analysis
gives
πI
loses = pK = (1 − α)[K + w + δπI(K,0)]
=
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
(K + w)
πE
wins = pE − pK + w + δπE(0,K)
= pE + w − (1 − δ)pK
40This is not strictly necessary for the analysis below. It suﬃces that the duopoly proﬁts do not
justify investing in the asset. If so, one can simply reinterpret w as the diﬀerence between total
industry proﬁts in monopoly and duopoly.
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If the incumbent wins, the payoﬀs are
πI
wins = pI + w + δπI(K,0)
= pI + w + δpK
πE
loses = 0
So the bids (and the equilibrium price of the auction) are all equal to
s = (1 − δ)pK − w
=
(1 − δ)(1 − α)
1 − δ(1 − α)
K −
α
1 − δ(1 − α)
w
The key point to note is that ﬁrms compete away (part, all or more than) the
monopoly rents in the market for additional services.41
5.2.3 Asset usable for “competition in the ﬁeld”
In a regulatory context, the regulator-auctioneer may be unable to prevent a losing
incumbent from competing for customers with the auction winner. For example,
the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 prevents federal and state regulators from
granting any monopoly franchise for telecommunications services. After a Demsetz-
type auction or an auction for universal service obligations, a losing incumbent that
fails to sell its asset may still want to compete “in the ﬁeld” with the winning entrant.
This changes the disagreement payoﬀs in post-auction bargaining in a diﬀerent way
than in the case in which the asset is used for the provision of other services (i.e.,
other than those for which the auction is held).
Under the assumptions of zero operating costs and Bertrand competition, the
usual analysis shows that









41The equilibrium bids could even be negative. If that would be the case, but negative bids are
not allowed, then we would have π
E(K,0) > 0. I will not pursue the issue here.
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Procurement costs are thus extremely sensitive to low levels of α: they tend to
inﬁnity as α tends to zero.42 The mixture of competition “for” and “in” the ﬁeld
can prove to be explosive.
6 Resale Obligations
In this paper it is assumed that an incumbent that loses its business is free to keep
its assets if it so wishes. In many cases, however, incumbents do not have complete
property rights over their assets. For example, Section 251 of the U.S. Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 mandates, inter alia, that incumbent Local Exchange Carrier
(ILEC) provide access to their networks (wholesale or only selected “unbundled net-
work elements”) at regulated prices to all other carriers. This may have a rather
counterintuitive consequence: the imposition of resale (or unbundling) obligations
may actually beneﬁt the incumbent.
The intuition for this result is that the possibility for the entrant to lease the
asset at (suﬃciently low) regulated prices destroys the credibility of a winning en-
trant’s threat to build duplicate facilities. For some range of regulated resale prices,
this would make the disagreement outcome in the subcontracting negotiations more
favorable to the incumbent and lead to higher equilibrium rental prices (hence higher
subsidies and proﬁts) than in the absence of resale obligations.
Let ¯ pK be the regulated asset resale price.43 Assume ¯ pK < K and consider what
happens when x = (K,0) and the entrant wins the auction. The eﬃcient outcome
is, as before, for the entrant to buy the incumbent’s asset. In case of disagreement,
the entrant will now buy the asset at price ¯ pK: the entrant would not accept a
higher price and the incumbent can
refuse to bargain until the entrant runs out of time when, faced only with the
alternative to procure the asset externally at cost K, it will buy the incumbent’s
asset at price ¯ pK.
42Of course, the usual caveat about cases with pK > K applies here, too.
43Given the assumption of risk-neutrality, this could simply be the expected result of some man-
dated arbitration process in case of bargaining failure.
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The usual calculations then show that, if ¯ pK < K, the Markov-perfect outcome
with zero variable cost is




¯ pK = ¯ pK
πE(K,0) = 0
If instead ¯ pK > K and, in particular, if the obligation is not imposed (i.e.,
¯ pK = ∞), the analysis in previous sections shows that the outcome would be
s = bI = bE =
(1 − δ)(1 − α)








Proposition 6 The imposition of a resale obligation increases procurement costs
and the incumbent’s proﬁts if and only if
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K < ¯ pK < K
This result must be taken with more than the customary grain of salt. Even
if the conditions of the above proposition apply, resale and unbundling obligations
can still be defended on the basis of two other possible eﬀects: eliminating the
costs from bargaining failures and relaxing the time-to-build constraints for winning
entrants. The latter may be a decisive element: if a winning entrant would not
have the time necessary to build duplicate assets, its bargaining power would be nil.
Temporary leasing obligations on incumbents would then be necessary conditions
for the competitiveness of the procurement process.
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7 Investment incentives and asset durability
So far, assets have been assumed to be eternally indestructible or, equivalently, to
require only veriﬁable (and perfectly eﬀective) maintenance. In this section, we
consider the case of unveriﬁable maintenance. In particular, we assume that unless
some unveriﬁable maintenance activity of cost m is undertaken at the beginning of a
period, the asset is completely destroyed at the end of that period with probability
f ∈ (0,1).44 For simplicity, we assume that proper maintenance is perfectly eﬀective
(i.e., it guarantees that the asset will not fail),45 that maintenance costs are paid at
the end of the period, that the franchise ends immediately before the next auction;46
and that negative bids are allowed in the auction.47 To make the problem interesting,
we assume that ﬁnes for asset failures are not feasible.
If only one asset exists, maintenance is technically eﬃcient iﬀ m ≤ fK. If both
ﬁrms have the asset, then maintenance is socially useful (ex post) only if both assets
would have failed without it – a probability f2 event. Hence it is never eﬃcient for
both of them to invest in maintenance and it is eﬃcient for (only) one of them to
do so iﬀ m ≤ f2K.
An incumbent’s incentive to invest in maintenance may be diﬀerent in the last
period of the franchise and in the other periods. If the entrant still has the asset at
that time, the incentives depend also on whether the entrant invests in maintenance.
Since πf(K,K) = 0, it is never an equilibrium choice for both ﬁrms to invest in
maintenance in the last period (or any other period). In fact, the entrant can never
have a strictly higher incentive to invest than the incumbent. Therefore, whenever
44The results in section 4 (additivity of procurement costs and ﬁrms’ proﬁt across service compo-
nents) suggest that the analysis can be easily generalized to the case in which the asset is composed
of several components, each subject to diﬀerent failure probabilities.
45The results below are also valid, mutatis mutandis, if even with proper maintenance, the prob-
ability of asset failure is strictly positive – and, of course, lower than without maintenance.
46Thus post-auction bargaining should be thought of as happening in “virtual” time at the
beginning of the auction period.
47This guarantees that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt will be zero unless it is the only one with the asset. If bids
were bound below by zero, then we could have π
f(K,K) > 0 as winning the auction could give a
positive probability of entering the next auction as the only ﬁrm with the asset.
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there is an equilibrium in which only the entrant invests, there is also an equilibrium
in which only the incumbent invests. For simplicity, I will only consider the latter.
If both ﬁrms have the asset at the beginning of the last period, the incumbent
will invest in maintenance in the last period iﬀ
fπI(K,0) + (1 − f)πI(K,K) − m = fπI(K,0) − m
is (weakly) larger than
f[fπI(0,0)+(1−f)πI(0,K)]+(1−f)[fπI(K,0)+(1−f)πI(K,K)] = (1−f)fπI(K,0)
This is equivalent to m ≤ f2πI(K,0).
If the entrant does not have the asset in the last period of the franchise, then
the incumbent will invest iﬀ
πI(K,0) − m ≥ fπI(0,0) + (1 − f)πI(K,0)
or, equivalently, iﬀ m ≤ fπI(K,0).
In the periods before the expiration of the franchise, the incumbent who let its
asset fail will surely have to buy a new one in the next period. Therefore, if the
entrant does not have the asset, the incumbent will invest iﬀ it is eﬃcient to do
so (m ≤ fK). If the entrant has the asset, then it may still have it in the next
period – and thus could sell it to the incumbent if needed. The value of the asset
to the incumbent depends on whether the incumbent invests in maintenance in the
last period. If it does, then the asset is not worth anything to the entrant (because
πI(K,K) = 0). Therefore, if the incumbent’s asset fails in previous periods and
the entrant still has a working asset, it will be exchanged at price (1 − α)K.48 The
investment condition will thus be
m ≤ f[fK + (1 − f)(1 − α)K] = fK[1 − (1 − f)(1 − α)]
Remark: Since the eﬃciency condition in this case is m ≤ f2K, it may seem
that we have obtained an overinvestment result: the incumbent may invest in main-
tenance activities that are ineﬃcient (when f2K < m < f2K + f(1 − f)(1 − α)K).
48I will not write the condition for the case in which the incumbent does not invest in the last
period.
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Actually, that is incorrect: in equilibrium only one ﬁrm has the asset, so the present
case is oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path.
Let us now compute the equilibrium in which the (current) incumbent always
invest in maintenance and ﬁrm I enters the auction as the only one that owns an
asset.
If ﬁrm I wins the auction at price pI (to be paid immediately as a lump sum),
the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
πI













eﬀ = pE − pK − mA + δπI(K,0)




dis = pE − K − mA + δ[1 − (1 − f)D]πI(K,0)
The gains from trade are ∆ = K + δ(1 − f)DπI(K,0) and the asset price is
pK = (1 − α)K + δ(1 − α)(1 − f)DπI(K,0)
By the usual calculations we get
πI(K,0) =
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)(1 − f)DK = pK
s = mA +
(1 − δ)(1 − α)






1 − δ(1 − α)(1 − f)DK
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Proposition 7 If maintenance is suﬃciently cheap, procurement costs are decreas-
ing in the perishability of the asset.
The intuition for this result is quite simple. The possibility that the asset is
destroyed increases the total proﬁts from building duplicate facilities because the
losing incumbent would probably be without the asset in the next auction and the
entrant would then make some positive proﬁt. This reduces the potential gains from
trade in bargaining, hence the asset price and the equilibrium bids.
Finally, we can check the investment conditions – and we need doing it only for
the case in which the incumbent is the only asset owner. In this case, the eﬃciency
condition is m ≤ fK. We have already found that in this case investment is eﬃcient
in all periods before the last one. In the last period, the condition is
m ≤ f
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)(1 − f)DK
We thus obtain
Proposition 8 The incentives to invest in the last period of the franchise are insuf-
ﬁcient, eﬃcient or excessive according to whether 1−α
1−δ(1−α)(1−f)D is smaller, equal
or larger than one or, equivalently, according to whether the transfer price of the
asset is smaller, equal or larger than K.
To the extent that parameter values for which pK > K are deemed unrealistic,
this result conﬁrms the conventional wisdom that ﬁrms tend to skimp on mainte-
nance near the end of their contracts.
This result should not be surprising: the opposite concerns of keeping procure-
ment costs low and investment incentives high are naturally hard to balance - for
auctions as well as for other realistic mechanisms. In fact, the incentive to invest in
maintenance is ineﬃciently low precisely when procurement costs reﬂect a value of
the asset that is lower than its production cost: you get what you pay for.
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This paper has shown that the presence of durable speciﬁc assets per se does not
necessarily eliminate the competitive pressure exercised by potential entrants, even
if no restriction is made over asset transfers and subcontracting agreements.49 This
optimistic conclusion relies crucially on aspects of the bargaining game played by
the ﬁrms over which regulators and buyers are unlikely to have much information.
However, the required assumption on such aspects, namely that a winning entrant
would not pay the incumbent for its old assets more than what it would pay external
providers for a new copy, does not seem unduly restrictive.50
This does not mean that free subcontracting “solves” all the problems related
to the Fundamental Transformation. First, Goldberg’s and Williamson’s intuitions
about the need for long term franchises has been conﬁrmed also within the con-
text of the models presented in this paper. Even without invoking any sort of
uncertainty, longer contract durations reduce procurement costs and may reduce
distortions in maintenance incentives. Since longer-term contracts require more
adjustments and renegotiations, the need for sophisticated governance governance
structure will correspondingly increase. Second, and more important, a lot has been
left outside of the context of this paper. In order to focus on asset speciﬁcity, we
have excluded several issues of practical importance in the design of competitive
procurement mechanism. Some of them have been excluded because unrelated to
asset speciﬁcity. Among those, it is worth mentioning the uncertainty over the type
of good to be transacted,51 the potential informational advantage of incumbents,52,
49Indeed, forcing incumbents to make their durable assets available at (reasonable) regulated
prices may actually increase procurement costs.
50Even without much information, regulators and buyers could probably help satisfy it by com-
mitting to take up part of the cost to build duplicate assets when winning entrants fail to buy them
from former incumbents. If bargaining is eﬃcient, this will remain oﬀ the equilibrium path and
have no adverse side-eﬀects.
51See Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for a Transaction Cost Economics perspective. See also Ganuza
and Huak (2002). Che (1993) and Branco (1997) study multidimensional bidding mechanisms and
Spulber (1989, Ch. 9) proposes a more complex regulatory mechanism.
52See Lewis and Yildirim (2002) for learning-by-doing. The work of Klemperer (1998) shows that
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collusion and reputational interactions with other markets. The importance of other
neglected issues, like the modelling of unforeseen contingencies, limited liability and
risk-aversion, could be ampliﬁed by the presence of expensive speciﬁc assets and
their analysis is simply left for future research. Such future research will probably
provide foundations for the Fundamental Transformation. But those foundations
will have to go deeper than the mere presence of bounded rationality, guile and
asset speciﬁcity.
A Equilibrium with positive operating costs
Given variable costs cI and cE, there are four possible states: x = (0,0), in which
nobody owns the asset, yet; x = (K,0), in which the incumbent is still the only
ﬁrm which owns the asset; x = (K,K), in which both ﬁrms own assets (i.e., the
entrant procured the asset in some previous period); x = (0,K), in which only
the entrant owns the asset (i.e., the entrant bought the incumbent’s asset in some
previous period).53 The net present value of total proﬁt of ﬁrm f in state (xI,xE) is
denoted by πf(xI,xE). By symmetry, there are only four cases to consider: duplicate
facilities, one eﬃcient incumbent, one ineﬃcient incumbent and initial procurement.
Duplicate facilities: Given the no-disposal assumption, x = (K,K) is an










[αc(1) + (1 − α)c(2)] (2)
For the reader’s convenience, I repeat the proof below.
Let L be the ﬁrm with the lowest cost and H the one with the highest cost.
The ﬁrms’ costs are cL and cH, their bids are bL and bH and the auction price is
even small informational advantages can have large eﬀects on procurement costs.
53I refer to ﬁrm I as the incumbent even in this third case, even though the term “original
incumbent” would be more precise.
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p = min{bL,bH}.
If bL < bH, H loses the auction and gets a zero payoﬀ, while L gets πL = p−cL =
bH − cL.
If bL > bH, then H wins the auction and it will subcontract the provision of
service to L. The gains from trade are cH−cL and, by assumption, H gets a fraction
α of them, so the subcontracting price is ps = cH − α(cH − cL) = αcL + (1 − α)cH.
The ﬁrms’s payoﬀs are then πL = ps − cL = (1 − α)(cH − cL) and πH = p − ps =
bL − αcL − (1 − α)cH.
In a second-price auction, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to bid one’s true
value from winning the auction. Since this is a procurement auction, there is a sign
reversal and the equilibrium bids are the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ obtained in
case of losing the auction and the payoﬀ obtained in case of winning the auction
(other than the auction price itself). Therefore bH = 0 − [p − αcL − (1 − α)cH − p]
and bL = (1 − α)(cH − cL) − (p − cL − p). The solution of this system of equations
is simply bL = bH = ps = αcL + (1 − α)cH and, regardless of how the tie is broken,
πL = (1 − α)(cH − cL) and πH = 0.
Eﬃcient incumbent: Consider now the case x = (K,0) when cI < cE. If
the entrant has won the auction at price s, eﬃciency requires that the entrant
subcontracts production to the incumbent. Letting pS denote the subcontracting
price, the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs in the eﬃcient outcome are
Eﬀ = {pS − cI + δπI(K,0);s − pS + δπE(K,0)}
In case of disagreement, the entrant would procure the asset at cost K and then
bargain again to subcontract production. Since the state would then be x = (K,K),
the disagreement payoﬀs would be
Dis = {(1 − α)(cE − cI) + δπI(K,K); (3)
s − K − αcI − (1 − α)cE + δπE(K,K)} (4)
The potential gains from trade are
GT = K + δ[πI(K,0) + πE(K,0) − πI(K,K) − πE(K,K)]
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Assume for the moment that
∆1 ≡ πI(K,0) + πE(K,0) − πI(K,K) − πE(K,K) ≥ 0
This will be shown to be true in equilibrium and guarantees that the gains
from trade are positive. The subcontracting price that gives a share (1 − α) to the
subcontractor (i.e., in this case, the incumbent) is
pS = αc1 + (1 − α)cE + (1 − α)K + δπI(K,K) + (1 − α)δ∆1 (5)
The ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
πI
L(s) = (1 − α)(cE − cI) + (1 − α)K + δπI(K,K) + (1 − α)δ∆1 (6)
πE
W(s) = s − αc1 − (1 − α)cE + δπE(K,0) − (1 − α)δ∆1 (7)
If the incumbent wins the auction there is no scope for subcontracting and proﬁts
are
πI
W(s) = s − cI + δπI(K,0) (8)
πE
L(s) = δπE(K,0) (9)
In a second price auction, a ﬁrm’s bid is the price level at which the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between winning and losing the auction:
bI = πI
L(s) − (πI
W(s) − s) = (10)
= pS = (11)
= πE
L(s) − (πE
W(s) − s) = (12)
= bE = s (13)
The ﬁrms’ total payoﬀ must then solve the following equations
πI(K,0) = (1 − α)(cE − cI) + (1 − α)K + δπI(K,K) + (1 − α)δ∆1 (14)
πE(K,0) = δπE(K,0) (15)
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Since δ ∈ [0,1) by assumption, we have πE(K,0) = 0. Using the already known




(cE − cI) +
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K (16)
and for the price level s
s(K,0) = αcI + (1 − α)cE +
(1 − α)(1 − δ)
1 − δ(1 − α)
K (17)
Finally, we can check that ∆1 = 1−α
1−δ(1−α)K > 0 as promised.
Ineﬃcient incumbent: Consider now the case x = (K,0) and cE < cI. By
switching the roles of the entrant and the incumbent, we already know from the
analysis of the previous case that




(cI − cE) +
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K (19)
It only remains to ﬁnd out what happens when the current incumbent (i.e., the
ﬁrms that is currently the only owner of the asset) is the less eﬃcient ﬁrm. In the
present case, this means ﬁnding πI(K,0) and πE(K,0). By symmetry, we will then
ﬁnd πI(0,K) and πE(0,K) for the case cI < cE.
If the entrant wins, eﬃcient subcontracting requires the sale of the asset and we
have
Dis = {0 + δπI(K,K);s − cE − K + δπE(K,K)}
Eﬀ = {pK + δπI(0,K);s − pK − cE + δπE(0,K)}
GT = K + δ[πI(0,K) + πE(0,K) − πI(K,K) − πE(K,K)]
= K +
δ(1 − α)
1 − δ(1 − α)
K > 0
The gains from trade are positive, so the asset is sold. The asset price and the









W(s) = s − pK − cE + δπE(0,K)
If the incumbent wins, eﬃcient subcontracting requires that the incumbent del-
egates production to the entrant to whom it transfers the asset. We obtain
Dis = {s − cI + δπI(K,0);0 + δπE(K,0)}
Eﬀ = {s − pKS + δπI(0,K);pKS − cE + δπE(0,K)} =
GT = cI − cE + δ[πI(0,K) + πE(0,K) − πI(K,0) − πE(K,0)]
As in the previous case, assume for the moment (and prove later) that ∆2 ≡
πI(0,K) + πE(0,K) − πI(K,0) − πE(K,0) ≥ 0. The gains from trade are thus
positive and the transaction will occur at price
pKS = αcE + (1 − α)cI − δ[πE(0,K) − πE(K,0)] + (1 − α)δ∆2
leading to ﬁrms’ proﬁts of
πI
W(s) = s − pKS
πE
L(s) = (1 − α)(cI − cE) + δπE(K,0) + (1 − α)δ∆2
The ﬁrms’ bids will thus be
bI = πI
L(s) − πI
W(s) + s =
= αcE + (1 − α)cI +
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
K +
−δ[πE(0,K) − πE(K,0)] + (1 − α)δ∆2
= πE
L(s) − πE
W(s) + s =




1 − δ(1 − α)
K
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and that πE(K,0) must solve the following equation
πE(K,0) = (1 − α)(cI − cE) + δπE(K,0) + (1 − α)δ∆2





Thus ∆2 = 0 ≥ 0, as promised.
The equilibrium price is then
s(K,0) = αcE + (1 − α)cI +
(1 − α)(1 − δ)
1 − δ(1 − α)
K
In sum, we have shown that, if at least one of the ﬁrms initially owns the asset
s(xI,xE) = αc(1) + (1 − α)c(2) +
(1 − α)(1 − δ)
1 − δ(1 − α)
(K − x(2)) (20)
πf(xI,xE) = (1 − α)(c(2) − cf)+ +
1 − α
1 − δ(1 − α)
(xf − x(2))+ (21)
where c(i) is the ith lowest cf, while x(i) is the ith highest xf.
Initial procurement: It remains to compute the equilibrium price s(0,0) and
proﬁts πf(0,0) in the initial auction, when neither ﬁrm owns the asset. By going
through the same kind of analysis, we obtain
s(0,0) = αc(1) + (1 − α)c(2) + [1 −
δ(1 − α)





(c(2) − cf)+ (23)
B Equilibrium with non-transferable asset
First note that, as in the case of transferable assets, x = K is an absorbing state
and the (stationary) equilibrium is the one computed in the previous chapter. We
can thus focus on state x = 0.
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If cI < cE, the fact that assets are not transferable is irrelevant. In this case,
eﬃcient subcontracting means delegating production to the incumbent and this does
not require building duplicate assets that would lower future subsidies. Formally,
the equilibrium computations of the previous section go through unchanged.
The trade-oﬀ between cost savings and lower future revenues occurs when cI >
cE. In this case, eﬃciency requires that duplicate assets be built if and only if cI −
cE > (1−δ)K, i.e., if and only if the net present value of cost savings from delegating
production to the entrant in all periods are larger than the cost of duplicating the
assets. Instead, as shown below, the equilibrium outcome implements a diﬀerent
(more stringent) test.
If the incumbent wins the auction and there is no subcontracting, payoﬀs are
Dis = {s − cI + δπI(0);δπE(0)}
If production is delegated to the entrant (who will have to build duplicate assets
for the purpose) and the subcontracting price is pS, payoﬀs are
Sub = {s − pS + δπI(K);pS − cE − K + δπE(K)}




Subcontracting will occur only if it increases total payoﬀs, i.e., if
GT = cI − cE − K − δ[πI(0) + πE(0) −
1 − α
1 − δ
(cI − cE)] (24)
is positive. Let us assume so for the moment.
By the usual assumption, the subcontracting price will give the entrant a fraction
1 − α of the gains from trade and will thus solve the following equation
pS − cE − K + δ
1 − α
1 − δ
(cI − cE) = δπE(0) + (1 − α)GT
The solution is
pS = α(cE + K) + (1 − α)cI − αδ
1 − α
1 − δ
(cI − cE) + αδπE(0) − (1 − α)δπI(0)
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If the entrant wins, the gains from trade are negative54 and there is no subcon-
tracting. The entrant will build duplicate assets and provide the service, leading to
payoﬀs equal to




The usual calculations show that
bE = pS = bI = s









Since ﬁrms can simply refuse to participate in the auction, the entrant’s proﬁt
must be positive. The preceding calculations thus identify an equilibrium only if




is positive.55 If so, the gains from trade can be shown to be exactly equal to
(25), hence they are positive and production will be delegated to the entrant - which
is the eﬃcient outcome since cE + 1−δ
1−αδK < cI implies cE + (1 − δ)K < cI.
The equilibrium price is then
s(0) = pS = α(cE +
1 − δ
1 − αδ
K) + (1 − α)cI (26)
in the ﬁrst period and
s(K) = αcE + (1 − α)cI (27)
forever after.
We have seen that, if (25) is negative, there is no (Markov) equilibrium in which
(24) is positive.












E(K)−K so the entrant has no
incentive to build duplicate assets before the auction.
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It only remains to consider the case in which (24) is negative, i.e., when the sum
of the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs would be lowered by duplicating the assets. As shown below,
this will occur in equilibrium only if (25) is also negative, so the analysis is complete.
So let us assume that (24) is negative and go through the usual calculations.
When the incumbent wins there is no subcontracting and payoﬀs are
{s − cI + δπI(0);δπE(0)}
When the entrant wins, the gains from subcontracting are equal to minus GT,
hence positive, and production is delegated to the incumbent at price
pS = cI − δπI(0) − (1 − α)GT
The corresponding payoﬀs are
{pS − cI + δπI(0);s − pS + δπE(0)}
We would then get bI = bE = s = pS and proﬁts would be
πI(0) =
(1 − α)(1 − αδ)




K − (cI − cE)]
πE(0) = 0
Note that πI(0) > 0 requires that (25) be negative. Note also that the entrant
cannot get positive payoﬀs from building duplicate assets and moving to x = K
because, as shown above, πE(K)−K = 1−α
1−δ (cI −cE)−K < 1−α
1−δ [cI −cE − 1−δ
1−αδK]
and this is negative whenever (25) is negative. Under this condition, we can verify
that GT < 0, as assumed above:
GT =
1 − αδ
(1 − δ)[1 − (1 − α)δ]




The equilibrium price can be computed by plugging these values back into the
formula for pS and we get
s = cI +
(1 − α)(1 − αδ)




K − (cI − cE)] (28)
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